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Abstract
Decisions made by machine learning systems
have increasing influence on the world, yet it is
common for machine learning algorithms to as-
sume that no such influence exists. An example
is the use of the i.i.d. assumption in content rec-
ommendation. In fact, the (choice of) content
displayed can change users’ perceptions and pref-
erences, or even drive them away, causing a shift
in the distribution of users. We introduce the term
auto-induced distributional shift (ADS) to de-
scribe the phenomenon of an algorithm causing a
change in the distribution of its own inputs. Our
goal is to ensure that machine learning systems do
not leverage ADS to increase performance when
doing so could be undesirable. We demonstrate
that changes to the learning algorithm, such as
the introduction of meta-learning, can cause hid-
den incentives for auto-induced distributional
shift (HI-ADS) to be revealed. To address this
issue, we introduce ‘unit tests’ and a mitigation
strategy for HI-ADS, as well as a toy environment
for modelling real-world issues with HI-ADS in
content recommendation, where we demonstrate
that strong meta-learners achieve gains in per-
formance via ADS. We show meta-learning and
Q-learning both sometimes fail unit tests, but pass
when using our mitigation strategy.
1. Introduction
Consider a content recommendation system whose perfor-
mance is measured by accuracy of predicting what users
will click. This system can achieve better performance by
either 1) making better predictions, or 2) changing the distri-
bution of users such that predictions are easier to make. We
propose the term auto-induced distributional shift (ADS)
to describe this latter kind of distributional shift, caused by
the algorithm’s own predictions or behaviour (Figure 1).
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ADS are not inherently bad, and are sometimes even desir-
able. But they can cause problems if they occur unexpect-
edly. It is typical in machine learning (ML) to assume (e.g.
via the i.i.d. assumption) that (2) will not happen. However,
given the increasing real-world use of ML algorithms, we
believe it is important to model and experimentally observe
what happens when assumptions like this are violated. This
is the motivation of our work.
Figure 1. Distributions of users over time. Left: A distribution
which remains constant over time, following the i.i.d assump-
tion. Right: Auto-induced Distributional Shift (ADS) results in a
change in the distribution of users in our content recommendation
environment. (see Section 7.3 for details).
In many cases, including news recommendation, we would
consider (2) a form of cheating—the algorithm changed
the task rather than solving it as intended. We care which
means the algorithm used to solve the problem (e.g. (1)
and/or (2)), but we only told it about the ends, so it didn’t
know not to ’cheat’. This is an example of a specification
problem (Leike et al., 2017; Ortega et al., 2018): a problem
which arises from a discrepancy between the performance
metric (maximize accuracy) and “what we really meant”: to
maximize accuracy via (1), which is difficult to encode as a
performance metric.
Ideally, we’d like to quantify the desirability of all possible
means, e.g. assign appropriate rewards to all potential strate-
gies and “side-effects”, but this is intractable for real-world
settings. Using human feedback to learn reward functions
which account for such impacts is a promising approach to
specifying desired behavior (Leike et al., 2018; Christiano
et al., 2017). But the same issue can arise whenever human
feedback is used in training: one means of improving per-
formance could be to alter human preferences, making them
easier to satisfy.Thus in this work, we pursue a complemen-
tary approach: managing learners’ incentives.
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Hidden Incentives for Auto-induced Distributional Shift
A learner has an incentive to behave in a certain way when
doing so can increase performance (e.g. accuracy or reward).
Informally, we say an incentive is hidden when the learner
behaves as if it were not present. But we note that changes
to the learning algorithm or training regime could cause
previously hidden incentives to be revealed, resulting in un-
expected and potentially undesirable behaviour. Managing
incentives (e.g. controlling which incentives are hidden/
revealed) can allow algorithm designers to disincentivize
broad classes of strategies (such as any that rely on ma-
nipulating human preferences) without knowing their exact
instantiation.1
Our goal in this work is to provide insight and practical
tools for understanding and managing learners’ incentives,
specifically hidden incentives for auto-induced distribu-
tional shift: HI-ADS. To study the conditions which cause
HI-ADS to be revealed, we present unit tests for detecting
HI-ADS in supervised learning (SL) and in reinforcement
learning (RL). We also create an environment which models
ADS in news recommendation, to illustrate the potential
effects of revealing HI-ADS in this setting.
The unit tests both have two means by which the learner
can improve performance: one which creates ADS and
one which does not. The intended method of improving
performance is one that does not induce ADS; the other
is ’hidden’ and we want it to remain hidden. A learner
"fails" the unit test if it nonetheless pursues the incentive to
increase performance via ADS. The SL unit test provides
an illustrative example. It is a prediction problem with
two targets, mean-zero Gaussians. The intended means of
improving performance is to make good predictions (i.e.
predict {0, 0}). However we create an incentive for ADS: a
prediction of >0.5 for the first target will reduce the variance
of the second target, reducing future loss. A learner fails the
unit test to the extent it predicts >0.5 for the first target.
In both the RL and SL unit tests, we find that ‘vanilla’
learning algorithms (e.g. minibatch SGD) pass the test, but
introducing an outer-loop of meta-learning (e.g. Population-
Based Training (PBT) (Jaderberg et al., 2017)) can lead
to high levels of failure. We find results consistent with
our unit tests in the content recommendation environment:
recommenders trained with PBT create earlier, faster, and
larger drift in user interests, and for the same level of per-
formance, create larger changes in the user base. These
results suggest that failure of our unit tests indicates that an
1 Note removing or hiding an incentive for a behavior is differ-
ent from prohibiting that behavior, which may still occur inciden-
tally. In particular, not having a (revealed) incentive for behaviors
that change a human’s preferences, is not the same as having a
(revealed) incentive for behaviors that preserve a human’s pref-
erences. The first is often preferable; we don’t want to prevent
changes in human preferences that occur “naturally”, e.g. as a
result of good arguments or evidence.
algorithm is prone to revealing HI-ADS in other settings.
Finally, we propose and test a mitigation strategy we call
context swapping. The strategy consists of rotating learn-
ers through different environments throughout learning, so
that they can’t see the results or correlations of their actions
in one environment over longer time horizons. This effec-
tively mitigates HI-ADS in our unit test environments, but
did not work well in content recommendation experiments.
2. Background
2.1. Meta-learning and population based training
Meta-learning is the use of machine learning techniques
to learn machine learning algorithms. This involves instan-
tiating multiple learning scenarios which run in an inner
loop (IL), while an outer loop (OL) uses the outcomes of
the inner loop(s) as data-points from which to learn which
learning algorithms are most effective (Metz et al., 2019).
The number of IL steps per OL step is called the interval.
Many recent works focus on multi-task meta-learning,
where the OL seeks to find learning rules that generalize
to unseen tasks by training the IL on a distribution of tasks
(Finn et al., 2017; Ren et al., 2018; Andrychowicz et al.,
2016). Single-task meta-learning includes learning an op-
timizer for a single task (Gong et al., 2018), and adaptive
methods for selecting models (Kalousis, 2000) or setting
hyperparameters (Snoek et al., 2012). For simplicity in this
initial study we focus on single-task meta-learning.
Population-based training (PBT; Jaderberg et al., 2017)
is a meta-learning algorithm that trains multiple learners
L1, ..., Ln in parallel, after each interval (T steps of IL)
applying an evolutionary OL step which consists of: (1)
Evaluate the performance of each learner, (2) Replace both
parameters and hyperparameters of 20% lowest-performing
learners with copies of those from the 20% high-performing
learners (EXPLOIT). (3) Randomly perturb the hyperparam-
eters (but not the parameters) of all learners (EXPLORE).
Two distinctive features of PBT are notable because they
give the OL more control than most meta-learning algo-
rithms (e.g. Bayesian optimization (Snoek et al., 2012))
over the dynamics and outcome of the learning process: (1)
OL applies optimization to parameters, not just hyperparam-
eters. This means the OL can directly select for parameters
which lead to ADS, instead of only being able to influence
parameter values via hyperparameters (2) Multiple OL
steps per training run.
2.2. Distributional shift and content recommendation
In general, distributional shift refers to change of the data
distribution over time. In supervised learning with data
x and labels y, this can be more specifically described as
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dataset shift: change in the joint distribution of P (x, y) be-
tween the training and test sets (Moreno-Torres et al., 2012;
Quionero-Candela et al., 2009). As identified by Moreno-
Torres et al. (2012), two common kinds of shift are: (1)
Covariate shift: changing P (x). In the example of content
recommendation, this corresponds to changing the user base
of the recommendation system. For instance, a media outlet
which publishes inflammatory content may appeal to users
with extreme views while alienating more moderate users.
This self-selection effect (Kayhan, 2015) may appear to a
recommendation system as an increase in performance, lead-
ing to a feedback effect, as previously noted by Shah et al.
(2018). This type of feedback effect has been identified
as contributing to filter bubbles and radicalization (Pariser,
2011; Kayhan, 2015). (2) Concept shift: changing P (y|x).
In the example of content recommendation, this corresponds
to changing a given user’s interest in different kinds of con-
tent. For example, exposure to a fake news story has been
shown to increase the perceived accuracy of (and thus pre-
sumably future interest in) the content, an example of the
illusory truth effect (Pennycook et al., 2019). For further de-
tails on these and other effects in content recommendation,
see Appendix 1.
3. Auto-induced Distribution Shift (ADS)
Auto-induced distribution shift (ADS) is distributional shift
caused by an algorithm’s behaviour. This is in contrast to
distributional shift which would happen even if the learner
were not present - e.g. for a crash prediction algorithm
trained on data from the summer, encountering snowy roads
is an example of distributional shift, but not auto-induced
distributional shift (ADS).
We emphasize that ADS are not inherently bad or good; of-
ten ADS can even be desirable: consider an algorithm meant
to alert drivers of imminent collisions. If it works well, such
a system will help drivers avoid crashing, thus making self-
refuting predictions which result in ADS. What separates
desirable and undesirable ADS? The collision-alert system
alters its data distribution in a way that is aligned with the
goal of fewer collisions, whereas the news manipulation
results in changes that are misaligned with the goal of better
predicting existing users’ interests (Leike et al., 2018).
In reinforcement learning (RL), ADS are typically encour-
aged as a means to increase performance. On the other hand,
in supervised learning (SL), the i.i.d. assumption precludes
ADS in theory. In practice, however, the possibility of using
ADS to increase performance (and thus an incentive to do
so) often remains. For instance, this occurs in online learn-
ing. In our experiments, we explicitly model such situations
where i.i.d. assumptions are violated: We study the behavior
of SL and myopic RL algorithms, in environments designed
to include incentives for ADS, in order to understand when
incentives are effectively hidden. Fig. 2 contrasts these
settings with typical RL and SL.
a1 a2
s1 s2
r1 r2
(a) RL: Incentives for ADS
are present and pursuing
them is desirable
a1 a2
s1 s2
r1 r2
(b) Myopic RL: Incentives
for ADS are present and pur-
suing them is undesirable
yˆ1 yˆ2
x1 x2
`1 `2
(c) SL with i.i.d. data: Incen-
tives for ADS are absent
yˆ1 yˆ2
x1 x2
`1 `2
(d) SL with ADS: Incentives
for ADS are present and pur-
suing them is undesirable
Figure 2. The widely studied problems of reinforcement learning
(RL) with state s, action s, reward s tuples, and i.i.d. supervised
learning (SL) with inputs x, predictions yˆ and loss l (a,c) are
free from incentive problems. We focus on cases where there are
incentives present which the learner is not meant to pursue (b,d).
Lines show paths of influence. The learner may have incentives to
influence any nodes descending from its action, A, or prediction,
yˆ. Which incentives are undesirable (orange) or desirable (cyan)
for the learner to pursue is context-dependent.
4. Incentives
For our study of incentives, we use the following terminol-
ogy: an incentive for a behavior (e.g. an action, a classifi-
cation, etc.) is present (not absent) to the extent that the
behaviour will increase performance (e.g. reward, accuracy,
etc.) (Everitt & Hutter, 2019). This incentive is revealed
to (not hidden from) a learner if it would, at higher than
chance levels, learn to perform the behavior given sufficient
capacity and training experience. The incentive is pursued
(not eschewed) by a learner if it actually performs the incen-
tivized behaviour. Note even when an incentive is revealed,
it may not be pursued, e.g. due to limited capacity and/or
data, or simply chance. See Fig 3.
For example, in content recommendation, the incentive to
drive users away is present if some user types are easier to
predict than others. But this incentive may be hidden from
the learner by using a myopic algorithm, e.g. one that does
not see the effects of its actions on the distribution of users.
The incentive might instead be revealed to the outer loop
of a meta-learning algorithm like PBT, which does see the
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Figure 3. Types of incentives, and their relationship to ADS.
effects of learner’s actions.
Even when this incentive is revealed, however, it might not
end up being pursued. For example, this could happen if
predicting which recommendations will drive away users is
too difficult a learning problem, or if the incentive to do so is
dominated by other incentives (e.g. change individual users’
interests, or improve accuracy of predictions). In general, it
may be difficult to determine empirically which incentives
are revealed, because failure to pursue an incentive can be
due to limited capacity, insufficient training, and/or random
chance. To address this challenge, we devise extremely sim-
ple environments (“unit tests”), where we can be confident
that revealed incentives will be pursued.
5. Hidden Incentives for Auto-induced
Distributional shift (HI-ADS)
Following from the definitions in Sections 3 and 4, HI-
ADS are incentives for behaviors that cause Auto-induced
Distributional Shift that are hidden from the learner, i.e.
the learner would not learn to perform the incentivized
behaviors at higher than chance levels, even given infinite
capacity and training experience.
Like ADS, HI-ADS are not necessarily problematic. Indeed,
hiding incentives can be an effective method of influencing
learner behavior. For example, hiding the incentive to ma-
nipulate users from a content recommendation algorithm
could prevent it from influencing users in a way they would
not endorse. However, if machine learning practitioners are
not aware that incentives are present, or that properties of the
learning algorithm are hiding them, then seemingly innocu-
ous changes to the learning algorithm may reveal HI-ADS,
and lead to significant unexpected changes in behavior.
Hiding incentives for ADS may seem counter-intuitive and
counter-productive in the context of reinforcement learning
(RL), where moving towards high-reward states is typically
desirable. However, for real-world applications of RL, the
ultimate goal is not a system that achieves high reward, but
rather one that behaves according to the designer’s inten-
tions. And as we discussed in the introduction, it can be
intractable to design reward functions that perfectly specify
intended behavior. Thus managing learners incentives can
still provide a useful tool for specification.
We have several reasons for focusing on HI-ADS: (1) The
issue of HI-ADS has not yet been identified, and thus is
likely to be neglected (at least sometimes) in practice. Our
“unit tests” are the first published empirical methodology
for assessing whether incentives are hidden or revealed by
different learning algorithms. (2) Machine learning algo-
rithms are commonly deployed in settings where ADS are
present, violating assumptions used to analyze their proper-
ties theoretically. This means learners could exploit ADS
in unexpected and undesirable ways if incentives for ADS
are not hidden. Hiding these incentives heuristically (e.g.
via off-line training) is a common approach, but potentially
brittle (if practitioners don’t understand how HI-ADS could
become revealed). In particular, meta-learning algorithms
can reveal HI-ADS, and are increasingly popular. (3) Sub-
stantial real-world issues could result from improper man-
agement of learner’s incentives. Examples include tamper-
ing with human-generated reward signals (Everitt & Hutter,
2018) (e.g. selecting news articles which manipulate user
interests), and creating “self-fulfilling prophecies” (e.g. driv-
ing up the value of a held asset by publicly predicting its
value will increase (Armstrong & O’Rorke, 2017)).
6. Removing HI-ADS via Context Swapping
We propose a technique called context swapping for remov-
ing incentives for ADS revealed by changes to the learn-
ing algorithm (e.g. introducing meta-learning). The tech-
nique trains N learners in parallel, and shuffles the learners
through N different copies of the same (or similar) environ-
ments; which copy a given learner inhabits can change at any
(or every) time-step. We use a deterministic permutation of
learners in environment copies, so that the i-th learner inhab-
its the j-th environment on time-steps t where j = (i+ t)
mod N , makes an observation, takes an action, and receives
a reward before moving to the next environment.
WhenN is larger than the interval of the OL optimizer, each
learner inhabits each copy for at most a single time-step
before an OL step is applied. Under the assumption that
different copies of the environment do not influence each
other, this technique can address HI-ADS in practice, as we
show in Sec. 7.2.1.
7. Experiments
In Sections 7.2 and 7.1, we introduce ‘unit tests’ for HI-
ADS. Our primary goal with these experiments is to convey
a crisp understanding of potential issues caused by reveal-
ing HI-ADS. Put simply, our experiments show that you
can have a learner which behaves as intended, and just by
using meta-learning (e.g. PBT), without changing the perfor-
mance metric (e.g. loss or rewards), the learner’s behavior
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Figure 4. (a) No context swapping (b) Context swapping. The
proposed technique rotates learners through different environments.
This removes the incentive for a learner to“invest” in a given
environment, since it will be swapped out of that context later and
not be able to reap the benefits of its investment.
can change completely.
We also show that context swapping is an effective mitiga-
tion technique in these environments. On the practical side,
the unit tests can be used to compare learning algorithms
and diagnose their propensity to reveal incentives.
In Section 7.3, we model a content recommendation sys-
tem. The goal of these experiments is to demonstrate how
HI-ADS could create issues for real-world content recom-
mendation systems such as news feeds, search results, or
automated suggestions. They also validate the usefulness
of the unit tests: algorithms failed the unit tests also re-
veal HI-ADS in this setting. We emphasize that ADS takes
place in this environment by construction. The point of
our experiments is that meta-learning can increase the rate
and/or extent of ADS, by revealing this incentive. We find
that context swapping is not effective in this environment,
highlighting the need for alternative mitigation strategies.
7.1. HI-ADS Unit Test 1: Supervised Learning
This unit test consists of a simple prediction problem. There
are no inputs, only an underlying state s ∈ {0, 1}, and
targets y ∈ R2 with y1, y2 ∼ N (0, s ∗ σ2),N (0, 1), with
corresponding predictions yˆ1, yˆ2. Additionally, st+1 = 0 iff
yˆ2 > .5. We use Mean Squared Error as the loss function, so
the optimal predictor is yˆ1, yˆ2 = (0, 0). However, predicting
yˆ2 > .5 reduces the variance of yˆ1, i.e. reduces future loss.
The baseline/IL predictor learns yˆ1, yˆ2 as parameters using
SGD with a learning rate of 0.001. For experiments with
meta-learning, PBT is the OL (with default settings, see
Section 2.2), used to tune the learning rate, with negative
loss on the final time-step of the interval as the performance
measure for PBT.
7.2. HI-ADS Unit Test 2: Myopic RL
This unit test is based on a version of the prisoner’s dilemma
(Prisner, 2014) where an agent plays each round against its
past self. The reward function is presented in Table 1. An
agent in this environment has a long-term, non-myopic,
incentive for cooperation (with its future self), but a current-
time-step, myopic, incentive for defection (from its future
self). The unit test evaluates whether a agent reveals the
non-myopic incentive even when the agent is meant to op-
timize for the present reward only (i.e. uses discount rate
γ = 0). Naively, we’d expect the non-myopic incentive to
be hidden from the agent in this case, and for the agent to
consistently defect; learning algorithms that do so pass
the test. But some learning algorithms also fail the unit test,
revealing the incentive for the agent to cooperate with its fu-
ture self. While aiming for myopic behavior may seem odd,
myopic learners have no incentives to cause distributional
shift, since it can only improve future performance. And
while making learners myopic may seem like a ’brute-force’
guaranteed way to manage HI-ADS, we show it is in fact
non-trivial to implement.
Formally, this environment is not a 2x2 game (as the origi-
nal prisoner’s dilemma); it’s a partially observable Markov
Decision Process (Åström, 1965; Kaelbling et al., 1998):
st, ot = at−1, {}
at ∈ {defect, cooperate}
P (st, at) = δ(at)
R(st, at) = I(st = cooperate) +
β I(at = cooperate)− 1/2
where I is an indicator function, and β = −1/2 is a parame-
ter controlling the alignment of incentives (see Appendix 3.2
for an exploration of different β values.). The initial state is
sampled as s0 ∼ U(defect, cooperate). Policies are
represented by a single real-valued parameter θ (initialized
as θ ∼ N (0, 1)) passed through a sigmoid whose output rep-
resents P (at = defect). We use REINFORCE (Williams,
1992) with discount factor γ = 0 as the baseline/IL opti-
mizer. PBT (with default settings, see Section 2.2) is used
to tune the learning rate, with reward on the final time-step
of the interval as the performance measure for PBT.
Table 1. Rewards for the RL unit test. Note that the myopic
(defect) action always increases reward at the current time-step,
but decreases reward at the next time-step - the incentive is hidden
from the point of view of a myopic learner. A supposedly myopic
learner ‘fails’ the unit test if the hidden incentive to cooperate
is revealed, i.e. if we see more cooperate (C) actions than
defect (D).
at = D at = C
st = at−1 = D −1/2 −1
st = at−1 = C 1/2 0
7.2.1. HI-ADS UNIT TESTS EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
AND DISCUSSION
We first show that agents trained with PBT fail the unit
tests more often than “vanilla” algorithms which do not use
meta-learning. We initialize the learning rate log-uniformly
between 0.01 and 1.0 for all experiments (whether using
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PBT or not). We expect and confirm that the following two
factors lead to higher rates of unit test failure: (1) Shorter
intervals: These give the OL more opportunities to influ-
ence the population. (2) Larger populations: These make
outliers with exceptional non-myopic performance more
likely, and OL makes them likely to survive and propagate.
The baseline (no meta-learning) algorithms all pass the unit
tests: hidden incentives are almost never revealed - see
blue curves in Fig. 5. However, agents trained with meta-
learning and large populations often fail the unit tests: see
orange curves in top rows of Fig. 5.
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(A) SL Unit Test. OL=PTB.
(B1) Myopic RL Unit Test. OL=PBT.
(B2) Myopic RL Unit Test. OL=REINFORCE
Figure 5. (A) Values of yˆ2 in the supervised learning (SL) unit
test. Larger values mean sacrificing present performance for future
performance (i.e. non-myopic exploitation of ADS). (B) Average
level of non-myopic cooperate behavior observed in the RL
unit test for HI-ADS, with two meta-learning algorithms (B1) PBT
and (B2) REINFORCE. Lower is better, since the goal is for non-
myopic incentives to remain hidden. Despite the inner loop being
fully myopic (simple MLP in the SL test, γ = 0 in RL test), in
all cases outer-loop (OL) optimizers reveal HI-ADS (top rows).
Context swapping significantly mitigates HI-ADS (bottom rows).
Furthermore, we verify that context swapping significantly
mitigates the effect of HI-ADS in both unit tests, decreas-
ing undesirable behaviour to near-baseline levels - see bot-
tom rows of Fig. 5. This effect can be explained as fol-
lows: Because context swapping transfers the benefits of
one learner’s action to the next learner to inhabit that en-
vironment, it increases the second learner’s fitness, and
thereby reduces the relative fitness (as evaluated by PBT’s
EXPLOIT step) of the non-myopic cooperate behaviour.
We observe some interesting exceptions with the combina-
tion of small populations and short PBT intervals: Although
context swapping still significantly decreases the effect of
HI-ADS, non-myopic cooperate behaviour is observed
as much as 20% of the time (for #learners=10, T = 1; see
bottom-left plot).
We also observe that PBT reveals HI-ADS even when
T = 1, where the explanation that PBT operates on a longer
time horizon than the inner loop does not apply. We pro-
vide a detailed explanation for how this might happen in
Appendix 3, but in summary, we hypothesize that there are
at least 2 mechanisms by which PBT is revealing HI-ADS:
(1) optimizing over a longer time-scale, and (2) picking up
on the correlation between an agent’s current policy and
the underlying state. Mechanism (2) can be explained in-
formally as reasoning as: “If I’m cooperating, then I was
probably cooperating on the last time-step as well, so my
reward should be higher”. As support for these hypotheses,
we run control experiments identifying two algorithms (each
sharing only one of these properties) that can fail the unit
test. Context swapping remains effective.
(1) Optimizing over a longer time-scale: replacing PBT
with REINFORCE as an outer-loop optimizer. The outer-
loop optimizes the parameters to maximize the summed
reward of the last T time-steps. As with PBT, we observe
non-myopic behavior, but now only when T > 1. This
supports our hypothesis that exploitation of HI-ADS is due
not to PBT in particular, but just to the introduction of
sufficiently powerful meta-learning. See Fig. 5 B2.
(2) Exploiting correlation: Q-learning with γ = 0 an
 = 0.1-greedy behavior policy and no meta-learning. If
either state was equally likely, the Q-values would be the
average of the values in each column in Table 1, so the esti-
mated Q(defect) would be larger. But the -greedy policy
correlates the previous action (i.e. the current state) and cur-
rent action (so long as the policy did not just change), so the
top-left and bottom-right entries carry more weight in the
estimates, sometimes causing Q(defect) ≈ Q(cooperate)
and persistent nonmyopic behavior. See Fig. 6 for results,
Appendix 4.2 for more results, and Appendix 4.1 for experi-
mental details.
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Figure 6. Q-learning fails the unit test for some random seeds;
empirical p(cooperate) stays around 80-90% in 3 of 5 exper-
iments (bottom row). Each column represents an independent
experiment. Q-values for the cooperate and defect actions
stay tightly coupled in the failure cases (col. 1,2,5), while in the
cases passing the unit test (col. 3,4) the Q-value of cooperate
decreases over time.
7.3. HI-ADS in content recommendation
We now present a toy environment for modeling content
recommendation of news articles, which includes the poten-
tial for ADS by incorporating the mechanisms mentioned in
Sec. 2.2, discussed as contributing factors to the problems of
fake news and filter bubbles. Specifically, the environment
assumes that presenting an article to a user can influence (1)
their interest in similar articles, and (2) their propensity to
use the recommendation service. These correspond to mod-
eling auto-induced concept shift of users, and auto-induced
covariate shift of the user base, respectively (see Sec. 2.2).
This environment includes the following components, which
change over (discrete) time: User type: xt, Article type:
yt, User interests: Wt (propensity for users of each type
to click on articles of each type), and User loyalty: gt
(propensity for users of each type to use the platform). At
each time step t, a user xt is sampled from a categorical
distribution, based on the loyalty of the different user types.
The recommendation system (a classifier) selects which
type of article to present in the top position, and finally
the user ‘clicks’ an article yt, according to their interests.
User loyalty for user type xt undergoes covariate shift: in
accordance with the self-selection effect, gt increases or
decreases proportionally to that user type’s interest in the
top article. The interests of user type xt (represented by
a column of Wt) undergoing concept shift; in accordance
with the illusory truth effect, interest in the topic of the top
article chosen by the recommender system always increases.
Formally, this environment is similar to a POMDP\R, i.e.
a POMDP with no reward function, also known as a world
model (Armstrong & O’Rourke, 2017; Hadfield-Menell
et al., 2017); the difference is that the learner observes
the input (otpre) before acting and only observes the target
(otpost) after acting. The states s, observations o, and actions
a are computed as follows:
st = (gt,Wt, xt, yt)
otpre, a
t, otpost = (x
t, yˆt, yt)
For further details on this environment, including the state
transition function, see Appendix 2.
Our recommender system is a 1-layer MLP trained with
SGD-momentum. Actions are sampled from the MLP’s
predictive distribution. For PBT, we use T = 10 and 20
agents, and use accuracy to evaluate performance. We run
20 trials, and match random seeds for trials with and without
PBT. See Appendix 3 for full experimental details.
7.3.1. CONTENT RECOMMENDATION EXPERIMENTAL
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We find that PBT yields significant improvements in training
time and accuracy, but also greater distributional shift (
Fig. 7). User base and user interests both change faster with
PBT, and user interests change more overall. We observe
that the distributions over user types typically saturate (to
a single user type) after a few hundred time-steps (Fig 1
and Fig. 7, Right). We run long enough to reach such
states, to demonstrate that the increase in ADS from PBT
is not transitory. The environment has a number of free
parameters, and our results are qualitatively consistent so
long as (1) the initial user distribution is approximately
uniform, and (2) the covariate shift rate (α1) is faster than
the concept shift rate (α2). See Appendix 2 for details.
We measure concept shift (change in P (y|x)) as the cosine
distance between each user types’ initial and current interest
vectors. And we measure covariate shift (change in P (x))
as the KL-divergence between the current and initial user
distributions, parametrized by g1 and gt, respectively. In
Figure 8, we plot concept shift and covariate shift as a func-
tion of accuracy. We observe that for both types of ADS,
at low levels of accuracy PBT actually causes less shift
than occur in baseline agents; HI-ADS are only observed
for accuracies above 60%. This suggests that only rela-
tively strong performers are able to pick up on the HI-ADS
revealed by PBT (Fig. 8).
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Figure 7. Content recommendation experiments. Left: using Pop-
ulation Based Training (PBT) increases accuracy of predictions
faster, leads to a faster and larger drift in users’ interests, P (y|x),
(Center); as well as the distribution of users, P (x), (Right). Shad-
ing shows std error over 20 runs.
Figure 8. Amount of auto-induced covariate shift (left) and auto-
induced concept shift (right) as a function of performance (ac-
curacy) averaged over all trials, learners, and time-steps. Only
relatively strong learners (those which achieve accuracy > 60%)
exhibit HI-ADS.
8. Related work
ADS in practice: We introduce the term ADS, but we are
far from the first to study it. Caruana et al. (2015) provide
an example of asthmatic patients having lower predicted
risk of pneumonia. Treating asthmatics with pneumonia
less aggressively on this basis would be an example of harm-
ful ADS; the reason they had lower pneumonia risk was
because they had received more aggressive care already.
Schulam & Saria (2017) note that such predictive models
are commonly used to inform decision-making, and propose
modeling counterfactuals (e.g. “how would this patient fare
with less aggressive treatment”) to avoid making such self-
refuting predictions. While their goal is to make accurate
predictions in the presence of ADS, our goal is to identify
and manage incentives for ADS. Goodfellow (2019) argues
that adversarial defenses that do not account for ADS are
critically flawed.
Non-i.i.d bandits: Contextual bandits (Wang et al., 2005;
Langford & Zhang, 2008) are frequently discussed as an ap-
proach to content recommendation (Li et al., 2010). While
bandit algorithms typically make the i.i.d. assumption,
counter-examples exist (Gheshlaghi Azar et al., 2014; Shah
et al., 2018); most famously, adversarial bandits (Auer et al.,
1995). Closest to our work is Shah et al. (2018), who con-
sider covariate shift caused by multi-armed bandits. Our
task in Sec. 7.3 is similar to their problem statement, but
more general in that we include user features, thus disen-
tangling covariate shift and concept shift. Our motivation
is also different: Shah et al. (2018) seek to exploit ADS,
whereas we aim to avoid hidden incentives for ADS.
Safety and incentives: Emergent incentives to influence
the world (such as HI-ADS) are at the heart of many con-
cerns about the safety of advanced AI systems (Omohun-
dro, 2008; Bostrom, 2014). Understanding and managing
the incentives of learners is also a focus of Armstrong &
O’Rourke (2017); Everitt (2018); Everitt et al. (2019); Co-
hen et al. (2019). While Everitt et al. (2019) focus on identi-
fying which incentives are present, we note that incentives
may be present and yet not be revealed or pursued - for ex-
ample, in supervised learning, there is an incentive to make
predictions that are over-fit to the test set, but we typically
hide the test set from the learner, which effectively hides this
incentive. While Carey et al. (2020); Everitt et al. (2019);
Armstrong & O’Rourke (2017) discuss methods of remov-
ing problematic incentives, we note in practice incentives
are often hidden rather than removed. Our work addresses
the efficacy of this approach and ways in which it can fail.
HI-ADS and meta-learning: As far as we know, our
work is the first to consider the problem of HI-ADS, or
its relation to meta-learning. A few previous works have
some relevance or resemblance. Rabinowitz (2019) doc-
uments qualitative differences in learning behavior when
meta-learning is applied. MacKay et al. (2019) and Lor-
raine & Duvenaud (2018) view meta-learning as a bilevel
optimization problem, with the inner loop playing a best-
response to the outer loop. In our work, the inner loop
is unable to achieve such best-response behavior; the outer
loop is too powerful (see Fig. 5). Finally, Sutton et al. (2007)
note that meta-learning can change learning behavior in a
way that improves performance by preventing convergence
of the inner loop.
9. Discussion and Conclusion
We have identified the phenomenon of auto-induced distri-
butional shift (ADS), and the problems that can arise when
there are hidden incentives for learners to induce distribu-
tional shift (HI-ADS). And our experiments demonstrate
that using meta-learning can reveal HI-ADS and lead learn-
ers to use ADS as a means of increasing performance.
Our work highlights the interdisciplinary nature of issues
with real-world deployment of ML systems - we show how
HI-ADS could play a role in important technosocial issues
like filter bubbles and the propagation of fake news. There
are a number of potential implications for our work: (1)
When HI-ADS are a concern, our methodology and envi-
ronments can be used to help diagnose whether and to what
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extent the final performance/behavior of a learner is due
to ADS and/or incentives for ADS, i.e. to quantify their
influence on that learner. (2) Comparing this quantitative
analysis for different algorithms could help us understand
which features of algorithms affect their propensity to reveal
HI-ADS, and aid in the development of safer and more ro-
bust algorithms. (3) Characterizing and identifying HI-ADS
in these tests is a first step to analyzing and mitigating other
(problematic) incentives, as well as to developing theoretical
understanding of incentives.
Broadly speaking, our work emphasizes that the choice of
machine learning algorithm plays an important role in speci-
fication, independently of the choice of performance metric.
A learner can use ADS to increase performance according to
the intended performance metric, and yet still behave in an
undesirable way, if we did not intend the learner to improve
performance by that method. In other words, performance
metrics are incomplete specifications: they only specify our
goals or ends, while our choice of learning algorithm plays
a role in specifying the means by which we intend an learner
to achieve those ends. With increasing deployment of ML
algorithms in daily life, we believe that (1) understanding
incentives and (2) specifying desired/allowed means of im-
proving performance are important avenues of future work
to ensure fair, robust, and safe outcomes.
10. Acknowledgements
Thanks to the DeepMind and Future of Humanity Institute
AI safety teams who gave lots of feedback on these ideas.
Thanks to Valentin Dalibard for help with Population Based
Training, and Toby Pohlen for help with using Google infras-
tructure. Thanks to Owain Evans, Audrey Durand, Jacob
Buckman, Michael Noukhovitch and Emmanuel Bengio for
feedback on drafts.
References
Allcott, H. and Gentzkow, M. Social media and fake news
in the 2016 election. Journal of Economic Perspectives,
31(2):211–36, May 2017.
Amazeen, M. A. and Wojdynski, B. W. Reducing native
advertising deception: Revisiting the antecedents and
consequences of persuasion knowledge in digital news
contexts. Mass Communication and Society, 0(0):1–26,
2018.
Andrychowicz, M., Denil, M., Gómez, S., Hoffman, M. W.,
Pfau, D., Schaul, T., Shillingford, B., and de Freitas, N.
Learning to learn by gradient descent by gradient descent.
In Neural Information Processing Systems, 2016.
Armstrong, S. and O’Rorke, X. Good and safe uses of ai
oracles. arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.05541, 2017.
Armstrong, S. and O’Rourke, X. Indifference methods for
managing agent rewards. Technical report, Future of
Humanity Institute, 2017.
Åström, K. J. Optimal control of Markov Processes with
incomplete state information. Journal of Mathematical
Analysis and Applications, 10:174–205, January 1965.
Auer, P., Cesa-Bianchi, N., Freund, Y., and Schapire, R. E.
Gambling in a rigged casino: The adversarial multi-armed
bandit problem. In Foundations of Computer Science,
1995.
Bakshy, E., Messing, S., and Adamic, L. A. Exposure to
ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook. Sci-
ence, 348(6239):1130–1132, 2015. ISSN 0036-8075. doi:
10.1126/science.aaa1160. URL http://science.
sciencemag.org/content/348/6239/1130.
Bostrom, N. Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies.
Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, NY, USA, 1st
edition, 2014.
Carey, R., Langlois, E., Everitt, T., and Legg, S.
The incentives that shape behaviour. arXiv preprint
arXiv:2001.07118, 2020.
Caruana, R., Lou, Y., Gehrke, J., Koch, P., Sturm, M., and
Elhadad, N. Intelligible models for healthcare: Predict-
ing pneumonia risk and hospital 30-day readmission. In
International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and
Data Mining, pp. 1721–1730, 2015.
Christiano, P., Leike, J., Brown, T. B., Martic, M., Legg,
S., and Amodei, D. Deep reinforcement learning from
human preferences, 2017.
Cohen, M. K., Catt, E., and Hutter, M. A strongly asymp-
totically optimal agent in general environments. Proceed-
ings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, Aug 2019. doi: 10.24963/ijcai.
2019/302. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/
ijcai.2019/302.
DiFranzo, D. and Gloria-Garcia, K. Filter bubbles and
fake news. XRDS, 23(3):32–35, April 2017. ISSN 1528-
4972. doi: 10.1145/3055153. URL http://doi.acm.
org/10.1145/3055153.
El-Bermawy, M. M. Your echo cham-
ber is destroying democracy, 2016. URL
https://www.wired.com/2016/11/
filter-bubble-destroying-democracy/.
Everitt, T. Towards Safe Artificial General Intelligence. PhD
thesis, Australian National University, 2018.
Everitt, T. and Hutter, M. The alignment problem for
bayesian history-based reinforcement learners. 2018.
Hidden Incentives for Auto-induced Distributional Shift
Everitt, T. and Hutter, M. Reward tampering problems and
solutions in reinforcement learning: A causal influence
diagram perspective. arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.04734,
2019.
Everitt, T., Ortega, P. A., Barnes, E., and Legg, S. Under-
standing agent incentives using causal influence diagrams.
part i: Single action settings, 2019.
Fazio, L., Brashier, N., Keith Payne, B., and Marsh,
E. Knowledge does not protect against illusory truth.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144(5):
993–1002, 10 2015. ISSN 0096-3445. doi: 10.1037/
xge0000098.
Finn, C., Abbeel, P., and Levine, S. Model-agnostic meta-
learning for fast adaptation of deep networks. In Interna-
tional Conference on Machine Learning, 2017.
Flaxman, S. and Goel, S. Filter bubbles, echo chambers,
and online news consumption. Public Opinion Quarterly,
2015.
Gheshlaghi Azar, M., Lazaric, A., and Brunskill, E. Online
stochastic optimization under correlated bandit feedback.
ArXiv preprint, 2014.
Gong, D., Zhang, Z., Shi, Q., van den Hengel, A., Shen, C.,
and Zhang, Y. Learning an optimizer for image deconvo-
lution. ArXiv preprint, 2018.
Goodfellow, I. J. A research agenda: Dynamic models to
defend against correlated attacks. ArXiv preprint, 2019.
Groshek, J. and Koc-Michalska, K. Helping populism
win? Social media use, filter bubbles, and sup-
port for populist presidential candidates in the 2016
us election campaign. Information, Communication
& Society, 20(9):1389–1407, 2017. doi: 10.1080/
1369118X.2017.1329334. URL https://doi.org/
10.1080/1369118X.2017.1329334.
Hadfield-Menell, D., Milli, S., Abbeel, P., Russell, S., and
Dragan, A. Inverse reward design. In Neural Information
Processing Systems, 2017.
Jaderberg, M., Dalibard, V., Osindero, S., Czarnecki, W. M.,
Donahue, J., Razavi, A., Vinyals, O., Green, T., Dunning,
I., Simonyan, K., Fernando, C., and Kavukcuoglu, K.
Population Based Training of Neural Networks. ArXiv
preprint, 2017.
Kaelbling, L. P., Littman, M. L., and Cassandra, A. R. Plan-
ning and acting in partially observable stochastic domains.
Artificial Intelligence, 101(1-2):99–134, May 1998. ISSN
0004-3702.
Kalousis, A. Model selection via meta-learning: A compar-
ative study. In IEEE International Conference on Tools
with Artificial Intelligence, 2000.
Kayhan, V. Confirmation bias: Roles of search engines and
search contexts. In International Conference on Informa-
tion Systems, 2015.
Langford, J. and Zhang, T. The epoch-greedy algorithm
for multi-armed bandits with side information. In Neural
Information Processing Systems, 2008.
Lee Howell, E. Digital wildfires in a hyperconnected world.
In Howell, L. (ed.), Global Risks 2013. World Economic
Forum, 2013. URL http://reports.weforum.
org/global-risks-2013/risk-case-1/
digital-wildfires-in-a-hyperconnected-world/.
Leike, J., Martic, M., Krakovna, V., Ortega, P. A., Everitt,
T., Lefrancq, A., Orseau, L., and Legg, S. AI safety
gridworlds. Technical report, DeepMind, 2017.
Leike, J., Krueger, D., Everitt, T., Martic, M., Maini, V., and
Legg, S. Scalable agent alignment via reward modeling:
a research direction. Technical report, DeepMind Safety
Research, 2018.
Li, L., Chu, W., Langford, J., and Schapire, R. E. A
contextual-bandit approach to personalized news article
recommendation. In International Conference on World
Wide Web, 2010.
Lorraine, J. and Duvenaud, D. Stochastic hyperparameter
optimization through hypernetworks. ArXiv preprint,
2018.
Luxton, D. D., June, J. D., and Fairall, J. M. Social me-
dia and suicide: A public health perspective. American
journal of public health, 102(2):195–200, 2012.
MacKay, M., Vicol, P., Lorraine, J., Duvenaud, D., and
Grosse, R. Self-tuning networks: Bilevel optimization of
hyperparameters using structured best-response functions.
ArXiv preprint, 2019.
Merriam-Webster. The real story of fake
news, 2017. URL https://www.
merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/
the-real-story-of-fake-news.
Metz, L., Maheswaranathan, N., Cheung, B., and Sohl-
Dickstein, J. Learning unsupervised learning rules. In
International Conference on Learning Representations,
2019.
Mihailidis, P. and Viotty, S. Spreadable spectacle in dig-
ital culture: Civic expression, fake news, and the role
of media literacies in "post-fact" society. American Be-
havioural Scientist, 2017.
Hidden Incentives for Auto-induced Distributional Shift
Moreno-Torres, J. G., Raeder, T., Alaiz-RodríGuez, R.,
Chawla, N. V., and Herrera, F. A unifying view on
dataset shift in classification. Pattern Recognition, 45
(1):521–530, January 2012.
Nguyen, T. T., Hui, P.-M., Harper, F. M., Terveen, L.,
and Konstan, J. A. Exploring the filter bubble: The
effect of using recommender systems on content diver-
sity. In Proceedings of the 23rd International Confer-
ence on World Wide Web, WWW ’14, pp. 677–686,
New York, NY, USA, 2014. ACM. ISBN 978-1-4503-
2744-2. doi: 10.1145/2566486.2568012. URL http:
//doi.acm.org/10.1145/2566486.2568012.
Noble, S. U. Algorithms of Oppression: How Search En-
gines Reinforce Racism. NYC Press, 2018.
Omohundro, S. M. The basic AI drives. In Conference on
Artificial General Intelligence, 2008.
Ortega, P. A., Maini, V., et al. Building safe artificial intelli-
gence: specification, robustness, and assurance, 2018.
Pariser, E. The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding
from You. The Penguin Group, 2011.
Pennycook, G., Cannon, T. D., and Rand, D. G. Prior expo-
sure increases perceived accuracy of fake news. Journal
of Experimental Psychology (forthcoming), 2019.
Prisner, E. Game Theory Through Examples. Mathematical
Association of America, 2014.
Quionero-Candela, J., Sugiyama, M., Schwaighofer, A., and
Lawrence, N. D. Dataset Shift in Machine Learning. The
MIT Press, 2009.
Rabinowitz, N. C. Meta-learners’ learning dynamics are
unlike learners’. ArXiv preprint, 2019.
Ren, M., Triantafillou, E., Ravi, S., Snell, J., Swersky,
K., Tenenbaum, J. B., Larochelle, H., and Zemel, R. S.
Meta-learning for semi-supervised few-shot classification.
ArXiv preprint, 2018.
Robson, D. The myth of the online echo chamber, 2018.
URL http://www.bbc.com/future/story/
20180416-the-myth-of-the-online-echo-chamber.
Schulam, P. and Saria, S. Reliable decision support using
counterfactual models. In Neural Information Processing
Systems, 2017.
Shah, V., Blanchet, J., and Johari, R. Bandit learning with
positive externalities. Neural Information Processing
Systems, 2018.
Shao, C., Ciampaglia, G. L., Varol, O., Yang, K.-C., Flam-
mini, A., and Menczer, F. The spread of low-credibility
content by social bots. Nature Communications, 9(4787),
2018.
Snoek, J., Larochelle, H., and Adams, R. P. Practical
Bayesian optimization of machine learning algorithms.
In Neural Information Processing Systems, 2012.
Sutton, R. S. and Barto, A. G. Introduction to Reinforcement
Learning. MIT Press, 1998.
Sutton, R. S., Koop, A., and Silver, D. On the role of
tracking in stationary environments. In International
conference on Machine learning, 2007.
Techopedia. Filter bubble, 2018. URL https:
//www.techopedia.com/definition/
28556/filter-bubble.
Wang, C.-C., Kulkarni, S. R., and Poor, H. V. Bandit prob-
lems with side observations. IEEE Transactions on Auto-
matic Control, 50(3):338–355, 2005.
Wikipedia contributors. Confirmation bias — Wikipedia,
the free encyclopedia, 2018. URL https:
//en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=
Confirmation_bias&oldid=875026726.
[Online; accessed 20-January-2019].
Williams, R. J. Simple statistical gradient-following al-
gorithms for connectionist reinforcement learning. In
Machine Learning, pp. 229–256, 1992.
Hidden Incentives for Auto-induced Distributional Shift
Appendices
1. Content recommendation in the wild
Filter bubbles, the spread of fake news, and other techno-
social issues are widely reported to be responsible for the
rise of populism (Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017), in-
crease in racism and prejudice against immigrants and
refugees (Noble, 2018), increase in social isolation and sui-
cide (Luxton et al., 2012), and, particularly with reference to
the 2016 US elections, are decried as threatening the foun-
dations of democracy (El-Bermawy, 2016). Even in 2013,
well before the 2016 American elections, a World Economic
Forum report identified these problems as a global crisis
(Lee Howell, 2013).
We focus on two related issues in which content recommen-
dation algorithms play a role: fake news and filter bubbles.
1.1. Fake news
Fake news (also called false news or junk news) is an ex-
treme version of yellow journalism, propaganda, or clickbait,
in which media that is ostensibly providing information fo-
cuses on being eye-catching or appealing, at the expense of
the quality of research and exposition of factual informa-
tion. Fake news is distinguished by being specifically and
deliberately created to spread falsehoods or misinformation
(Merriam-Webster, 2017; Mihailidis & Viotty, 2017).
Why does fake news spread? It may at first seem the solution
is simply to educate people about the truth, but research tells
us the problem is more multifaceted and insidious, due to a
combination of related biases and cognitive effects includ-
ing confirmation bias (people are more likely to believe
things that fit with their existing beliefs), priming (exposure
to information unconsciously influences the processing of
subsequent information, i.e. seeing something in a credible
context makes things seem more credible) and the illusory
truth effect (i.e. people are more likely to believe some-
thing simply if they are told it is true).
Allcott & Gentzkow (2017) track about 150 fake news sto-
ries during the 2016 US election, and find the average Amer-
ican adult saw 1-2 fake news stories, just over half believed
the story was true, and likelihood of believing fake news in-
creased with ideological segregation (polarization) of their
social media. Shao et al. (2018) examine the role of so-
cial bots in spreading fake news by analyzing 14 million
Twitter messages. They find that bots are far more likely
than humans to spread misinformation, and that success of
a fake news story (in terms of human retweets) was heavily
dependent on whether bots had shared the story.
Pennycook et al. (2019) examine the role of the illusory truth
effect in fake news. They find that even a single exposure to
a news story makes people more likely to believe that it is
true, and repeat viewings increase this likelihood. They find
that this is not true for extremely implausible statements (e.g.
“the world is a perfect cube”), but that “only a small degree
of potential plausibility is sufficient for repetition to increase
perceived accuracy” of the story. The situation is further
complicated by peoples’ inability to distinguish promoted
content from real news - Amazeen & Wojdynski (2018) find
that fewer than 1/10 people were able to tell when content
was an advertisement, even when it was explicitly labelled
as such. Similarly, Fazio et al. (2015) find that repeated
exposure to incorrect trivia make people more likely to
believe it, even when they are later able to identify the trivia
as incorrect.
1.2. Filter bubbles
Filter bubbles, a term coined and popularized by Pariser
(2011) are created by positive or negative feedback loops
which encourage users or groups of users towards increas-
ing within-group similarity, while driving up between-group
dissimilarity. The curation of this echo chamber is called
self-selection (people are more likely to look for or select
things that fit their existing preferences), and favours what
Techopedia (2018) calls intellectual isolation. In the con-
text of social and political opinions, this is often called the
polarization effect (Wikipedia contributors, 2018).
Filter bubbles can be encouraged by algorithms in two main
ways. The first is the most commonly described: simply by
showing content that is similar to what a user has already
searched for, search or recommender systems create a posi-
tive feedback loop of increasingly-similar content (Pariser,
2011; Kayhan, 2015). The second way is similar but op-
posite - if the predictions of an algorithm are good for a
certain group of people, but bad for others, the algorithm
can do better on its metrics by driving hard-to-predict users
away. Then new users to the site will either be turned off
entirely, or see an artificially homogenous community of
like-minded peers, a phenomena Shah et al. (2018) call
positive externalities.
In a study of 50,000 US-based internet users, Flaxman &
Goel (2015) find that two things increase with social me-
dia and search engine use: (1) exposure of an individual to
opposing or different viewpoints, and (2) mean ideological
distance between users. Many studies cite the first result as
evidence of the benefits of internet and social media (Rob-
son, 2018; Bakshy et al., 2015), but the correlation of expo-
sure with ideological distances demonstrates that exposure
is not enough, and might even be counterproductive.
Facebook’s own study on filter bubbles results show that the
impact of the news feed algorithm on filter bubble “size” (a
measure of homogeneity of posts relative to a baseline) is
almost as large as the impact of friend group composition
(Bakshy et al., 2015). Kayhan (2015) specifically study
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the role of search engines in confirmation bias, and find
that search context and the similarity of results in search
engine results both reinforce existing biases and increase the
likelihood of future biased searches. Nguyen et al. (2014)
similarly study the effect of recommender systems on in-
dividual users’ content diversity, and find that the set of
options recommended narrows over time.
Filter bubbles create an ideal environment for the spread of
fake news: they increase the likelihood of repeat viewings of
similar content, and because of the illusory truth effect, that
content is more likely to be believed and shared (Pennycook
et al., 2019; DiFranzo & Gloria-Garcia, 2017; Pariser, 2011).
We are not claiming that HI-ADS are entirely or even mostly
responsible for these problems, but we do note that they can
play a role that is worth addressing.
incentive-compatible (β = 0.5)
incentive-orthogonal (β = 0.0)
incentive-opposed (β = −0.5)
Figure 9. Average level of non-myopic (i.e. cooperate) be-
havior learned by agents in the unit test for HI-ADS. Despite
making the inner loop fully myopic (γ = 0), population-based
training (PBT) can cause HI-ADS, leading agents to choose the
cooperate action (top row). context swapping successfully
prevents this (bottom row). Columns (from left to right) show
results for populations of 10, 100, and 1000 learners. In the legend,
“interval” refers to the interval (T ) of PBT (see Sec. 2.2). Suffi-
ciently large populations and short intervals are necessary for PBT
to induce nonmyopic behavior.
2. Extra experiments and reproducibility
details
2.1. HI-ADS unit test
2.1.1. ALIGNMENT OF INCENTIVES EXPLORATION
This section presents an exploration of the parameter β,
which controls the alignment of incentives in the HI-ADS
unit tests (see Table 2).
To clarify the interpretation of experiments, we distinguish
between environments in which myopic (defect) vs. non-
myopic (cooperate) incentives are opposed, orthogonal, or
compatible. Note that in this unit test myopic behaviour
(defection) is what we want to see.
1. Incentive-opposed: Optimal myopic behavior is in-
compatible with optimal nonmyopic behavior (classic
prisoner’s dilemma; these experiments are in the main
paper).
2. Incentive-orthogonal: Optimal myopic behavior may
or may not be optimal nonmyopic behavior.
3. Incentive-compatible: Optimal myopic behavior is
necessarily also optimal nonmyopic behavior.
We focused on incentive-opposed environment (β = −1/2)
in the main paper in order to demonstrate that HI-ADS can
be powerful enough to change the behavior of the system
in an undesirable way. Here we also explore incentive-
compatible and incentive-orthogonal environments because
they provide useful baselines, helping us distinguish a sys-
tematic bias towards nonmyopic behavior from other rea-
sons (such as randomness or optimization issues) for behav-
ior that does not follow a myopically optimal policy.
2.1.2. WORKING THROUGH A DETAILED EXAMPLE FOR
PBT WITH T = 1
To help provide intuition on how (mechanistically) PBT
could lead to persistent levels of cooperation, we walk
through a simple example (with no inner loop). Consider
PBT with T = 1 and a population of 5 deterministic
agents A1, ..., A5 playing cooperate and receiving reward
of r(Ai) = 0. Now suppose A1 suddenly switches to play
defect. Then r(A1) = 1/2 on the next time-step (while
the other agents’ reward is still 0), and so PBT’s EXPLOIT
step will copy A1 (without loss of generality to A2). On
the following time-step, r(A2) = 1/2, and r(A1) = −1/2,
so PBT will clone A2 to A1, and the cycle repeats. Similar
reasoning applies for larger populations, and T > 1.
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Table 2. β controls the extent to which myopic and nonmyopic incentives are aligned.
β Environment Cooperating
< 0 incentive-opposed yields less reward on the current time-step (myopically detrimental)
= 0 incentive-orthogonal does not affect the current reward (myopically indifferent)
> 0 incentive-compatible yields more reward on the current time-step (myopically beneficial)
2.1.3. Q-LEARNING EXPERIMENT DETAILS
We show that, under certain conditions, Q-learning can learn
to (primarily) cooperate, and thus fails the HI-ADS unit test.
We estimate Q-values using the sample-average method,
which is guaranteed to converge in the fully observed, tab-
ular case (Sutton & Barto, 1998). The agent follows the
-greedy policy with  = 0.1. In order to achieve this re-
sult, we additionally start the agent off with one synthetic
memory where both state and action are defect and therefor
R(defect) = −.5, and we hard-code the starting state to
be cooperate (which normally only happens 50% of the
time). Without this kind of an initialization, the agent al-
ways learns to defect. However, under these conditions, we
find that 10/30 agents learned to play cooperate most of
the time, with Q(cooperate) and Q(defect) both hovering
around −0.07, while others learn to always defect, with
Q(cooperate) ≈ −0.92 and Q(defect) ≈ −0.45. context
swapping, however, prevents majority-cooperate behavior
from ever emerging, see Figure 12.
2.1.4. Q-LEARNING: FURTHER RESULTS
To give a more representative picture of how often Q-
learning fails the unit test, we run a larger set of experiments
with Q-learning, results are in Figure 11. It’s possible that
the failure of Q-learning is not persistent, since we have not
proved otherwise, but we did run much longer experiments
and still observe persistent failure, see Figure 10.
Figure 10. The same experiments as Figures 6, 11, run for 50,000
time-steps instead of 3000, to illustrate the persistence of non-
myopic behavior.
Figure 11. More independent experiments with Q-learning, ex-
actly following Figure 6. Q-learning fails the unit test in a total of
10/30 experiments (including those from Figure 6).
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Figure 12. More independent experiments with Q-learning, ex-
actly following Figure 6, except also using context swapping. This
leads to a 100% success rate on the unit test.
2.2. Content recommendation
2.2.1. ENVIRONMENT DETAILS
The evironment has the following components:
1. User type, xt: categorical variable representing differ-
ent types of users. The content recommender condi-
tions its predictions on the type of the current user.
2. User loyalty, gt: the propensity for users of each type
to use the platform. User xt is sampled from a categori-
cal distribution with parameters given by softmax(gt).
3. Article type, yt: a categorical variable (one-hot en-
coding) representing the type of article selected by the
user.
4. User interests, Wt: a matrix whose entries W tx,y rep-
resent the average interest user of type x have in articles
of type y.
At each time step t, a user xt is sampled from a categori-
cal distribution (based on the loyalty of the different user
types), then the recommendation system selects which type
of article to present in the top position, and finally, the user
selects an article. The goal of the recommendation system
is to predict the likelihood that the user would click on each
of the available articles, in order to select the one which is
most interesting to the user.
User loyalty for xt then changes in accordance with the
self-selection effect, increasing or decreasing proportionally
to their interest in the top article. The interests of user
type xt (represented by a column of Wt) also change; in
accordance with the illusory truth effect, their interest in
the topic of the top article (as chosen by the recommender
system) always increases. Overall, this environment is an
extremely crude representation of reality, but it allows us to
incorporate both the effects of self-selection (via covariate
shift), and the illusory truth effect (via concept shift).
Formally, this environment is similar to a POMDP\R, i.e.
a POMDP with no reward function, also known as a world
model (Armstrong & O’Rourke, 2017; Hadfield-Menell
et al., 2017); the difference is that the learner observes the
input before acting and only observes the target after acting.
The states, observations, and actions given below.
st = (gt,Wt, xt, yt)
otpre, a
t, otpost = (x
t, yˆt, yt)
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The state transition function is defined by:
gt+1xt = g
t
xt + α1W
t
xt,yˆt
W
t+1/2
xt,yˆt =W
t
xt,yˆt + α2; W
t+1
xt =
W
t+1/2
xt
‖Wt+1/2xt ‖2
xt+1 ∼ softmax(gt+1)
yt+1 ∼ softmax(Wt+1xt+1)
Where yˆt is the top article as chosen by the recommender,
and α1, α2 represent the rate of covariate and concept shift
(respectively). The update for Wt+1 merely increases the
interest of user type xt in article type yˆt, then normalizes
the interests for that user type.
2.2.2. REPRODUCIBILITY DETAILS
For these experiments, the recommendation system is a
ReLU-MLP with 1 hidden layer of 100 units, trained via su-
pervised learning with SGD (learning rate = 0.01) to predict
which article a user will select. Actions are sampled from
the MLP’s predictive distribution. We apply PBT without
any hyperparameter selection (this amounts to just doing
the EXPLOIT step), and an interval of 10, selecting on accu-
racy. We use a population of 20 learners (whether applying
PBT or not), and match random seeds for the trials with
and without PBT. We initialize g1 and W1 to be the same
across the 20 copies of the environment (i.e. the learners
start with the same user population), but these values di-
verge throughout learning. For the environment, we set the
number of user and article types both to 10. Initial user loy-
alties are randomly sampled from N (0, 0.03), α1 = 0.03,
and α2 = 0.003.
2.2.3. CONTEXT SWAPPING IN CONTENT
RECOMMENDATION
We believe context swapping is not appropriate for the con-
tent recommendation environment, since when the envi-
ronments diverge, optimal behavior may differ across en-
vironments. Nevertheless, we ran experiments with it for
completeness. The main effect appears to be to hamper
learning when PBT is not used, see Figure 13. Notably, it
does not appear to significantly influence the rate or extent
of ADS when combined with PBT.
2.2.4. EXPLORATION OF ENVIRONMENT PARAMETERS
In Figure 14, we examine the effect of the rate-of-change
parameters (α1, α2) of the content recommendation envi-
ronment on the results provided in the paper. As noted
there, our results are qualitatively consistent so long as (1)
the initial user distribution is approximately uniform, and
(2) the covariate shift rate (α1) is faster than the concept
shift rate (α2). These distributions are updated by differ-
ent mechanisms, and are not directly comparable. Concept
shift changes the task more radically, requiring a learner to
change its predictions, rather than just become accurate on a
wider range of inputs. We conjecture that changes in P (y|x)
must therefore be kept smooth enough for the outer loop to
have pressure to capitalize on HI-ADS.
Figure 13. Context swapping doesn’t have the desired effect in the
content recommendation environment.
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α1 = 0.01 , α2 = 0.001 α1 = 0.1 , α2 = 0.001
α1 = 0.01 , α2 = 0.01 α1 = 0.1 , α2 = 0.01
α1 = 0.01 , α2 = 0.1 α1 = 0.1 , α2 = 0.1
Figure 14. Content recommendation results for different values of α1, α2.
